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TEMPORAL INTERPRETATION OF INTUITIONISTIC QUANTIFIERS
GURAM BEZHANISHVILI AND LUCA CARAI
Abstract. We show that intuitionistic quantifiers admit the following temporal interpre-
tation: ∀xA is true at a world w iff A is true at every object in the domain of every future
world, and ∃xA is true at w iff A is true at some object in the domain of some past world.
For this purpose we work with a predicate version of the well-known tense propositional
logic S4.t. The predicate logic Q◦S4.t is obtained by weakening the axioms of the standard
predicate extension QS4.t of S4.t along the lines Corsi weakened QK to Q◦K. The Go¨del
translation embeds the predicate intuitionistic logic IQC into QS4 fully and faithfully. We
provide a temporal version of the Go¨del translation and prove that it embeds IQC into Q◦S4.t
fully and faithfully; that is, we show that a sentence is provable in IQC iff its translation is
provable in Q◦S4.t. Faithfulness is proved using syntactic methods, while we prove fullness
utilizing the generalized Kripke semantics of Corsi.
1. Introduction
Unlike classical connectives, intuitionistic connectives lack symmetry. It was noted already
by McKinsey and Tarski [17] that Heyting algebras (which are algebraic models of intuition-
istic propositional calculus IPC) are not symmetric even in the weak sense, meaning that the
order-dual of a Heyting algebra may no longer be a Heyting algebra. In contrast, Boolean
algebras (which are algebraic models of classical propositional calculus) are symmetric in
the strong sense, meaning that the order-dual of a Boolean algebra A is not only a Boolean
algebra, but even isomorphic to A.
This non-symmetry has been addressed by several authors, resulting in the concepts of
bi-Heyting algebras and symmetric Heyting algebras. Bi-Heyting algebras are obtained by
adding to the signature of Heyting algebras a binary operation of co-implication, while sym-
metric Heyting algebras by adding a de Morgan negation (and then co-implication becomes
de Morgan dual of implication). The order-dual of a bi-Heyting algebra is again a bi-Heyting
algebra, and the order-dual of a symmetric Heyting algebra A is even isomorphic to A. Thus,
the class of bi-Heyting algebras is symmetric in the weak sense, while the class of symmetric
Heyting algebras is symmetric in the strong sense (hence the name).
The Go¨del translation of IPC into S4 extends to a translation of the Heyting-Brouwer
calculus HB of Rauszer [18] into the tense extension S4.t of S4, which has the future S4-
modality F and the past S4-modality P . The algebraic models of HB are bi-Heyting
algebras, and implication is interpreted using F and co-implication using P .
Key words and phrases. Intuitionistic quantifiers, temporal interpretation, Go¨del translation.
Acknowledgment: We would like to thank the reviewers whose comments have improved the presentation
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This story of non-symmetry also extends to intuitionistic quantifiers. Let IQC be the intu-
itionistic predicate calculus and QS4 the predicate S4. Not only the intuitionistic quantifiers
∀x and ∃x are not definable from each other (unlike the classical quantifiers), but the Go¨del
translation ( )t of IQC into QS4 is asymmetric in that (∀xA)t = ∀xAt and (∃xA)t = ∃xAt.
This is manifested in the interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers in Kripke models. Indeed,
a world w of a Kripke model satisfies ∀xA iff A is true at every object of the domain Dv of
every world v accessible from w, while w satisfies ∃xA iff A is true at some object in the
domain Dw of w. If we think of the worlds of a Kripke model as “states of knowledge,” and
the order between the states is temporal, then we can interpret the intuitionistic universal
quantifier as “for every object in the future,” while the existential quantifier as “for some
object in the present.”
In this article we present a more symmetric interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers as
“for every object in the future” for ∀x and “for some object in the past” for ∃x. We show
that such interpretation is supported by translating IQC fully and faithfully into a predicate
tense logic by an appropriate modification of the Go¨del translation. As far as we know, this
approach has not been considered in the past. One obvious obstacle is that it is unclear what
predicate tense logic to choose for such a translation. Indeed, a natural candidate would be
the standard predicate extension QS4.t of S4.t. However, since QS4.t proves the Barcan
formula, and hence the Kripke frames validating QS4.t have constant domains, IQC does
not translate fully into QS4.t. Instead we work with a weaker logic in which the universal
instantiation axiom
∀xA→ A(y/x)
is replaced by a weaker version
∀y(∀xA→ A(y/x)).
This approach is along the lines of Kripke [15], Hughes and Cresswell [13], Fitting and
Mendelsohn [6], and Corsi [3] who considered modal predicate logics without the Barcan
and/or converse Barcan formulas. The generalized Kripke frames considered in this semantics
have two domains associated to each world, an inner domain and an outer domain. The inner
domains are always contained in the outer domains and are not necessarily increasing. While
variables are interpreted in the outer domains, the scope of quantifiers is restricted to the
inner domains. Utilizing this approach, we define a tense predicate logic Q◦S4.t which is
sound with respect to the generalized Kripke semantics with nonempty increasing inner
domains and constant outer domains. We modify the Go¨del translation to define a temporal
translation of IQC into Q◦S4.t as follows:
⊥t = ⊥
P (x1, . . . , xn)
t = FP (x1, . . . , xn) for each n-ary predicate symbol P
(A ∧ B)t = At ∧ Bt
(A ∨ B)t = At ∨ Bt
(A→ B)t = F (A
t → Bt)
(∀xA)t = F∀xA
t
(∃xA)t = ♦P∃xA
t
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Here F is the S4-modality interpreted as “always in the future” and ♦P is the S4-modality
interpreted as “sometime in the past.” Thus, the modification of the Go¨del translation con-
cerns the clause for ∃xA. Our main result states that this translation is full and faithful in
the following sense:
Main Theorem.
• For any formula A in the language of IQC, we have
IQC ⊢ A iff Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t
where x1, . . . , xn are the free variables in A.
• If A is a sentence, then
IQC ⊢ A iff Q◦S4.t ⊢ At.
The proof of this surprising result is along the lines of the standard proof of fullness and
faithfulness of the Go¨del translation of IQC into QS4. We would like to stress that the main
challenge is not so much the proof itself, but rather finding the “right” predicate tense modal
logic into which to translate IQC. We find it of interest to explore philosophical (as well as
practical) consequences of this new temporal point of view on IQC.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall the intuitionistic predicate logic
IQC and its Kripke completeness. In Section 3 we briefly review the basics of modal predicate
logics and their Kripke semantics, including weaker modal predicate logics. In Section 4 we
recall the tense propositional logic S4.t, consider its standard predicate extension QS4.t,
and then introduce its weakening Q◦S4.t which is our main tense predicate logic of interest.
We conclude the section by observing that Q◦S4.t is sound with respect to a version of
the generalized Kripke semantics studied by Kripke [15], Hughes and Cresswell [13], Fitting
and Mendelsohn [6], and Corsi [3]. Our main result, that IQC embeds into Q◦S4.t fully
and faithfully, is proved in Section 5. We prove faithfulness syntactically, while fullness
is proved semantically. We conclude the paper with Section 6 in which we describe some
open problems our study has generated. Finally, the Appendix contains the proofs of some
technical lemmas used in Sections 4 and 5.
2. The intuitionistic predicate logic
Let IQC be the intuitionistic predicate logic. We recall that the language L of IQC consists
of countably many individual variables x, y, . . ., countably many n-ary predicate symbols
P,Q, . . . (for each n ≥ 0), the logical connectives ⊥,∧,∨,→, and the quantifiers ∀, ∃. We do
not add any constants to L since this results in the temporal translation not being faithful
(see Remark 5.11).
Formulas are defined as usual by induction and are denoted with upper case letters
A,B, . . .. Let x, y be individual variables and A a formula. If x is a free variable of A
and does not occur in the scope of ∀y or ∃y, then we denote by A(y/x) the formula obtained
from A by replacing all the free occurrences of x by y.
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The following definition of IQC is taken from [9, Sec 2.6]. We point out that, unlike [9], we
prefer to work with axiom schemes, and hence do not need the inference rule of substitution.
Definition 2.1. The intuitionistic predicate logic IQC is the least set of formulas of L
containing all substitution instances of theorems of IPC, the axiom schemes
(1) ∀xA→ A(y/x) Universal instantiation (UI)
(2) A(y/x)→ ∃xA
(3) ∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB) with x not free in A
(4) ∀x(A→ B)→ (∃xA→ B) with x not free in B
and closed under the inference rules
A A→ B
B
Modus Ponens (MP) A
∀xA
Generalization (Gen)
We next describe Kripke semantics for IQC (see [16, 8]).
Definition 2.2. An IQC-frame is a triple F = (W,R,D) where
• W is a nonempty set whose elements are called the worlds of F.
• R is a partial order on W .
• D is a function that associates to each w ∈ W a nonempty set Dw such that wRv
implies Dw ⊆ Dv for each w, v ∈ W . The set Dw is called the domain of w.
Definition 2.3.
• An interpretation of L in F is a function I associating to each world w and any
n-ary predicate symbol P an n-ary relation Iw(P ) ⊆ (Dw)
n such that wRv implies
Iw(P ) ⊆ Iv(P ).
• A model is a pair M = (F, I) where F is an IQC-frame and I is an interpretation in
F.
• Let w be a world of F. A w-assignment is a function σ associating to each individual
variable x an element σ(x) of Dw. Note that if wRv, then σ is also a v-assignment.
• Let σ and τ be two w-assignments and x an individual variable. Then τ is said to
be an x-variant of σ if τ(y) = σ(y) for all y 6= x.
We next recall the definition of when a formula A is true in a world w of a modelM = (F, I)
under the w-assignment σ, written M σw A.
Definition 2.4.
M σw ⊥ never
M σw P (x1, . . . , xn) iff (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)) ∈ Iw(P )
M σw B ∧ C iff M 
σ
w B and M 
σ
w C
M σw B ∨ C iff M 
σ
w B or M 
σ
w C
M σw B → C iff for all v with wRv, if M 
σ
v B, then M 
σ
v C
M σw ∀xB iff for all v with wRv and each v-assignment τ
that is an x-variant of σ, M τv B
M σw ∃xB iff there exists a w-assignment τ
that is an x-variant of σ such that M τw B
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Definition 2.5.
• We say that A is true in a world w of M, written M w A, if for all w-assignments
σ, we have M σw A.
• We say that A is true in M, written M  A, if for all worlds w ∈ W , we have
M w A.
• We say that A is valid in a frame F, written F  A, if for all models M based on F,
we have M  A.
We have the following well-known completeness of IQC with respect to Kripke semantics.
Theorem 2.6 ([16]). The intuitionistic predicate logic IQC is sound and complete with respect
to Kripke semantics; that is, for each formula A,
IQC ⊢ A iff F  A for each IQC-frame F.
3. Modal predicate logics
Modal predicate logics were first studied by Barcan [1] and Carnap [2] in 1940s. The
semantic study of modal predicate logics was initiated by Kripke [14, 15] in late 1950s/early
1960s. Since then many completeness results have been obtained with respect to Kripke
semantics, but there is also a large body of incompleteness results, which is one of the
reasons that the model theory of modal predicate logics is less advanced than that of modal
propositional logics (see, e.g., [9, 10] and the references therein).
Let K be the least normal modal propositional logic and let QK be the standard predicate
extension of K. The language L of QK is the extension of L with the modality . Since
the modal logics we consider are based on the classical logic, it is sufficient to only consider
the logical connectives ⊥,→ and the quantifier ∀. The logical connectives ∧,∨,¬,↔, the
quantifier ∃, and the modality ♦ are treated as usual abbreviations.
We next recall the definition of QK (see, e.g., [9, Sec 2.6], but note, as in Section 2, that
we work with axiom schemes instead of having the inference rule of substitution).
Definition 3.1. The modal predicate logic QK is the least set of formulas of L containing
all substitution instances of theorems of K, the axiom schemes (i) and (iii) of Definition 2.1,
and closed under (MP), (Gen), and
A
A
Necessitation (N)
The definition of QK-frames F = (W,R,D) is the same as that of IQC-frames (see Def-
inition 2.2) with the only difference that R can be an arbitrary relation. Models are also
defined the same way, but without the requirement that wRv implies Iw(P ) ⊆ Iv(P ). The
connectives and quantifiers are interpreted at each world in the usual classical way, and
M |=σw A iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv ⇒M |=
σ
v A).
Truth and validity of formulas are defined as usual.
We next give a brief history of first Kripke completeness results for modal predicate logics.
In 1959 Kripke [14] proved Kripke completeness of predicate S5. In late 1960s Cresswell [4,
5] (see also Hughes and Cresswell [12]), Schu¨tte [19], and Thomason [20] proved Kripke
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completeness of predicate T and S4. Kripke completeness of QK was first established by
Gabbay [7, Thm. 8.5]1:
Theorem 3.2. The modal predicate logic QK is sound and complete with respect to Kripke
semantics.
The following two principles play an important role in the study of modal predicate logics.
They were first considered by Barcan [1].
∀xA→ ∀xA converse Barcan formula (CBF)
∀xA→ ∀xA Barcan formula (BF)
It is easy to see that CBF is a theorem of QK. Indeed, this follows from Theorem 3.2 and
the fact that domains of each QK-frame are increasing. On the other hand, a QK-frame
validates BF iff it has constant domains, meaning that wRv implies Dw = Dv, and we have
the following well-known theorem (see, e.g., [7, Thm. 9.3]):
Theorem 3.3. The logic QK + BF is sound and complete with respect to the class of QK-
frames with constant domains.
A modal predicate logic whose Kripke frames have neither increasing nor decreasing do-
mains was considered already by Kripke [15]. Building on this work, Hughes and Cress-
well [13, pp. 304–309] introduced a similar predicate modal logic and proved its completeness
with respect to a generalized Kripke semantics. Fitting and Mendelsohn [6, Sec. 6.2] gave
an alternate axiomatization of this logic. Building on the work of Fitting and Mendelsohn,
Corsi [3] defined the system Q◦K whose axiomatization contains a weakening of the universal
instantiation axiom.
Definition 3.4. The logic Q◦K is the least set of formulas of L containing all substitution
instances of theorems of K, the axiom schemes
(1) ∀y(∀xA→ A(y/x)) (UI◦)
(2) ∀x(A→ B)→ (∀xA→ ∀xB)
(3) ∀x∀yA↔ ∀y∀xA
(4) A→ ∀xA with x not free in A
and closed under (MP), (Gen), and (N).
Remark 3.5. In Definition 3.4, replacing UI◦ with UI yields an equivalent definition of QK.
Therefore, Q◦K is contained in QK.
Kripke frames for Q◦K generalize Kripke frames for QK by having two domains, inner and
outer.
Definition 3.6. A Q◦K-frame is a quadruple F = (W,R,D, U) where
• (W,R) is a K-frame.
• D is a function that associates to each w ∈ W a set Dw. The set Dw is called the
inner domain of w.
1We would like to thank Ilya Shapirovsky and Valentin Shehtman for useful discussions on the history of
Kripke completeness for modal predicate logics.
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• U is a nonempty set containing the union of all the Dw. The set U is called the outer
domain of F.
Definition 3.6 is a particular case of the frames considered by Corsi [3] where increasing
outer domains are allowed. For our purposes, taking a fixed outer domain U is sufficient.
We recall from [3] how to interpret L in a Q
◦K-frame F = (W,R,D, U).
Definition 3.7.
• An interpretation of L in F is a function I associating to each world w and an n-ary
predicate symbol P an n-ary relation Iw(P ) ⊆ U
n.
• A model is a pair M = (F, I) where F is a Q◦K-frame and I is an interpretation in F.
• An assignment in F is a function σ that associates to each individual variable an
element of U .
• If σ and τ are two assignments and x is an individual variable, τ is said to be an
x-variant of σ if τ(y) = σ(y) for all y 6= x.
• We say that an assignment σ is w-inner for w ∈ W if σ(x) ∈ Dw for each individual
variable x.
We next recall from [3] the definition of when a formula A is true in a world w of a model
M = (F, I) under the assignment σ, written M σw A.
Definition 3.8.
M σw ⊥ never
M σw P (x1, . . . , xn) iff (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)) ∈ Iw(P )
M σw B → C iff M 
σ
w B implies M 
σ
w C
M σw ∀xB iff for all x-variants τ of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dw, M 
τ
w B
M σw B iff for all v such that wRv, M 
σ
v B
Definition 3.9. A formula A is true in a model M = (F, I) at the world w ∈ W (in symbols
M w A) if for all assignments σ, we have M 
σ
w A. The definition of truth in a model and
validity in a frame are the same as in Definition 2.5.
We have the following completeness result for Q◦K, see [3, Thm. 1.32] and its proof.
Theorem 3.10. Q◦K is sound and complete with respect to the class of Q◦K-frames.
Definition 3.11. Let F = (W,R,D, U) be a Q◦K-frame.
• We say that F has increasing inner domains if wRv implies Dw ⊆ Dv for each
w, v ∈ W .
• We say that F has decreasing inner domains if wRv implies Dv ⊆ Dw for each
w, v ∈ W .
• If F has both increasing and decreasing inner domains, we say that it has constant
inner domains.
The following axiom scheme guarantees nonempty inner domains (hence the abbreviation):
∀xA→ A with x not free in A (NID)
The next proposition is not difficult to verify (see, e.g., [6, Sec. 4.9] and [3, pp. 1487–1488]).
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Proposition 3.12. Let F = (W,R,D, U) be a Q◦K-frame.
• F validates CBF iff F has increasing inner domains.
• F validates BF iff F has decreasing inner domains.
• F validates NID iff F has nonempty inner domains.
We have the following completeness results for logics obtained by adding CBF, BF, and
NID to Q◦K (see [3, Thms. 1.30, 1.32, and Footnote 7]):
Theorem 3.13.
• Q◦K + CBF is sound and complete with respect to the class of Q◦K-frames with in-
creasing inner domains.
• Q◦K+ CBF+ BF is sound and complete with respect to the class of Q◦K-frames with
constant inner domains.
• Adding NID to the above two logics or to Q◦K yields completeness of the resulting
logics with respect to the corresponding classes of frames which have nonempty inner
domains.
On the other hand, completeness of Q◦K+ BF remains open (see [3, p. 1510]).
4. The logic Q◦S4.t
The tense predicate logic we will translate IQC into is based on the well-known tense
propositional logic S4.t. We use F (“always in the future”) and P (“always in the past”)
as temporal modalities. Then ♦F (“sometime in the future”) and ♦P (“sometime in the
past”) are usual abbreviations ¬F¬ and ¬P¬.
Definition 4.1. The logic S4.t is the least set of formulas of the tense propositional language
containing all substitution instances of S4-axioms for both F and P , the axiom schemes
(1) A→ P♦FA
(2) A→ F♦PA
and closed under (MP) and
A
FA
F -Necessitation (NF)
A
PA
P -Necessitation (NP)
Relational semantics of S4.t consists of Kripke frames F = (W,R) where R is reflexive
and transitive. As usual, propositional letters are interpreted as subsets of W , classical
connectives as the corresponding set-theoretic operations on the powerset of W , and for
temporal modalities we set:
w  FA iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒ v  A)
w  PA iff (∀v ∈ W )(vRw⇒ v  A)
It is well known that S4.t is sound and complete with respect to its relational semantics.
Let LT be the bimodal predicate language obtained by extending L with two modalities
F and P .
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Definition 4.2. The logic QS4.t is the least set of formulas of LT containing all substitution
instances of theorems of S4.t, the axiom schemes (i) and (iii) of Definition 2.1, and closed
under (MP), (Gen), (NF), and (NP).
The following are temporal versions of CBF and BF:
F∀xA→ ∀xFA converse Barcan formula for F (CBFF)
∀xFA→ F∀xA Barcan formula for F (BFF)
P∀xA→ ∀xPA converse Barcan formula for P (CBFP)
∀xPA→ P∀xA Barcan formula for P (BFP)
The proof that QK ⊢ CBF (see, e.g., [15, p. 88]) can be adapted to prove that QS4.t ⊢ CBFF
and QS4.t ⊢ CBFP. It is also well known that CBFF and BFP, as well as CBFP and BFF
are derivable from each other in any tense predicate logic. Therefore, all four are theorems
of QS4.t. This is reflected in the fact that QS4.t-frames have constant domains. Indeed,
QS4.t is complete with respect to this semantics (see Section 6). But this is problematic
for translating IQC fully into QS4.t since IQC-frames with constant domains validate the
additional axiom ∀x(A ∨B)→ (A ∨ ∀xB), where x is not free in A, which is not a theorem
of IQC (see, e.g., [8, p. 53, Cor. 8]).
Consequently, we need to work with a weaker logic than QS4.t. To this end, we introduce
the logic Q◦S4.t, which weakens QS4.t the same way Q◦K weakens QK.
Definition 4.3. The logic Q◦S4.t is the least set of formulas of LT containing all substitution
instances of theorems of S4.t, the axiom schemes (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) of Q◦K (see Definition 3.4),
NID, CBFF, and closed under (MP), (Gen), (NF), and (NP).
As follows from Proposition A.1 in the Appendix, BFP is a theorem of Q
◦S4.t. In fact,
CBFF and BFP are derivable from each other and the other axioms of Q
◦S4.t.
Definition 4.4. A Q◦S4.t-frame is a Q◦K-frame F = (W,R,D, U) (see Definition 3.6) with
nonempty increasing inner domains whose accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive.
Models and assignments are defined as in Definition 3.7. The clauses of when a formula
A of LT is true in a world w of a Q
◦S4.t-model M = (F, I) under the assignment σ, written
M σw A, are defined as in Definition 3.8, but we replace the -clause with the following two
clauses:
M σw FB iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒M 
σ
v B)
M σw PB iff (∀v ∈ W )(vRw⇒M 
σ
v B)
For formulas of LT we define truth in a model and validity in a frame as in Definition 3.9.
Theorem 4.5. Q◦S4.t is sound with respect to the class of Q◦S4.t-frames; that is, for each
formula A of LT and Q
◦S4.t-frame F, from Q◦S4.t ⊢ A it follows that F  A.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that each axiom scheme is valid in all Q◦S4.t-frames and that
each rule of inference preserves validity. This can be done by direct verification. We only
show that the axiom scheme CBFF is valid in all Q
◦S4.t-frames. Let M = (F, I) be a Q◦S4.t-
model, w ∈ W , and σ an assignment. If M σw F∀xA, then for all v with wRv we have
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M σv ∀xA. This implies that for each x-variant τ of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dv we have M 
τ
v A.
Since Dw ⊆ Dv, this is in particular true for x-variants τ of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dw. Therefore, for
each x-variant τ of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dw and for each v with wRv we have M 
τ
v A. Thus, for
each x-variant τ of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dw, we have M 
σ
w FA. Consequently, M 
σ
w ∀xFA.
This shows that F  F∀xA→ ∀xFA for each Q
◦S4.t-frame F. 
On the other hand, completeness of Q◦S4.t remains an interesting open problem, which is
related to the open problem of completeness of Q◦K + BF (see Section 6).
5. The translation
In this section we prove our main result that the temporal modification (described in the
Introduction) of the Go¨del translation embeds IQC into Q◦S4.t fully and faithfully. Our
strategy is to prove faithfulness of the translation syntactically, while fullness will be proved
by semantical means, utilizing Kripke completeness of IQC.
Our syntactic proof of faithfulness is based on the following technical lemma, the proof
of which we give in the Appendix. To keep the notation simple, we denote lists of variables
by bold letters. If x = x1, . . . , xn, we write ∀x for ∀x1 · · · ∀xn. We point out that it is a
consequence of axioms (ii) and (iii) of Q◦K that from the point of view of provability in
Q◦S4.t, the order of variables in ∀x does not matter.
Lemma 5.1.
(1) Let C be an instance of an axiom scheme of IQC and x the list of free variables in
C. Then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀xCt.
(2) Let A,B be formulas of L, x the list of variables free in A→ B, y the list of variables
free in A, and z the list of variables free in B. If Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x(A → B)t and
Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀yAt, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀zBt.
(3) Let A be a formula of L, x a variable, y the list of variables free in A, and z the list
of variables free in ∀xA. If Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀yAt, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀z (∀xA)t.
Proof. For (i) see the proof of Lemma A.5, for (ii) see the proof of Lemma A.6, and for (iii)
see the proof of Lemma A.7. 
Theorem 5.2. Let A be a formula of L and x1, . . . , xn the free variables of A. If IQC ⊢ A,
then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the proof of A in IQC. If A is an instance
of an axiom of IQC, then the result follows from Lemma 5.1(i). Lemma 5.1(ii) takes care of
the case in which the last step of the proof of A is an application of (MP). Finally, if the last
step of the proof of A is an application of (Gen) to the variable x, use Lemma 5.1(iii). 
Remark 5.3. We are prefixing the translation of A with ∀x1 · · · ∀xn because it is not true in
general that IQC ⊢ A implies Q◦S4.t ⊢ At. For example, if A is an instance of the universal
instantiation axiom, which is an axiom of IQC, then At is not in general a theorem of Q◦S4.t.
Definition 5.4.
• For an IQC-frame F = (W,R,D) let F = (W,R,D, U) where U =
⋃
{Dw | w ∈ W}.
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• For an IQC-model M = (F, I) let M = (F, I).
Remark 5.5.
• It is obvious that F is a Q◦S4.t-frame.
• If I is an interpretation in F, then I is also an interpretation in F because for each
n-ary predicate letter P we have Iw(P ) ⊆ D
n
w ⊆ U
n. Therefore, M is well defined.
• The w-assignments in F are exactly the w-inner assignments in F.
The proof of the following technical lemma is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 5.6. If A is a formula of L, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ At → FA
t.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma A.2. 
Lemma 5.7. Let A be a formula of L, M = (F, I) a Q◦S4.t-model, and σ an assignment in
F. If v, w ∈ W with vRw, then M σv A
t implies M σw A
t.
Proof. Suppose vRw and M σv A
t. By Lemma 5.6 and Theorem 4.5, M σv A
t → FA
t.
Therefore, M σv FA
t, which yields M σw A
t because vRw. 
Proposition 5.8. Let A be a formula of L, M = (F, I) an IQC-model based on an IQC-frame
F = (W,R,D), and w ∈ W .
(1) For each w-assignment σ,
M σw A iff M 
σ
w A
t.
(2) If x1, . . . , xn are the free variables of A, then
M w A iff M w ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t.
Proof. (i). Induction on the complexity of A. Let A be an atomic formula P (x1, . . . , xn).
Since wRv implies Iw(P ) ⊆ Iv(P ) and R is reflexive, we have
M σw P (x1, . . . , xn) iff (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)) ∈ Iw(P )
iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv ⇒ (σ(x1), . . . , σ(xn)) ∈ Iv(P ))
iff M σw FP (x1, . . . , xn)
iff M σw P (x1, . . . , xn)
t
The cases where A = ⊥, A = B ∧ C, and A = B ∨ C are straightforward.
If A = B → C, then using the inductive hypothesis, we have
M σw B → C iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒ (M 
σ
v B ⇒M 
σ
v C))
iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒ (M σv B
t ⇒M σv C
t))
iff M σw F (B
t → Ct)
iff M σw (B → C)
t
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If A = ∀xB, then using the inductive hypothesis, we have
M σw ∀xB iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒ for each v-assignment τ that is
an x-variant of σ we have M τv B)
iff (∀v ∈ W )(wRv⇒ for each assignment τ that is
an x-variant of σ with τ(x) ∈ Dv we have M 
τ
v B
t)
iff M σw F∀xB
t
iff M σw (∀xB)
t
If A = ∃xB, then using the inductive hypothesis, reflexivity of R, Lemma 5.7, and the
fact that vRw implies Dv ⊆ Dw, we have
M σw ∃xB iff there is a w-assignment τ that is an x-variant of σ
such that M τw B
iff there is an assignment τ that is an x-variant of σ
with τ(x) ∈ Dw such that M 
τ
w B
t
iff there is v ∈ W such that vRw and an assignment ρ that is
an x-variant of σ with ρ(x) ∈ Dv such that M 
ρ
v B
t
iff M σw ♦P∃xB
t
iff M σw (∃xB)
t
(ii). By Definition 2.5, M w A iff M 
σ
w A for each w-assignment σ. As noted in
Remark 5.5, w-assignments in F are exactly the w-inner assignments in F. Therefore, by (i),
M w A iff M 
σ
w A
t for each w-inner assignment σ. It follows from the interpretation of the
universal quantifier inM thatM σw A
t for each w-inner assignment σ iffM w ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t.
Thus, M w A iff M w ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t. 
Theorem 5.9. Let A be a formula of L and x1, . . . , xn the free variables of A. If Q
◦S4.t ⊢
∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t, then IQC ⊢ A.
Proof. Suppose IQC 0 A. Theorem 2.6 implies that there is an IQC-model M such that
M 2w A for some world w. By Proposition 5.8(ii), M 2w ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t. Thus, Q◦S4.t 0
∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t by Theorem 4.5. 
By putting Theorems 5.2 and 5.9 together we arrive at the main result of the paper
mentioned in the introduction.
Theorem 5.10.
• Let A be a formula of L and x1, . . . , xn the free variables of A. We have
IQC ⊢ A iff Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x1 · · · ∀xnA
t.
• If A is a sentence of L, then
IQC ⊢ A iff Q◦S4.t ⊢ At.
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Remark 5.11. If we allow constants in L, Theorem 5.9 is no longer true in its current
form. Indeed, constants in IQC and Q◦S4.t behave like free variables and we would have
the problem described in Remark 5.3. However, it can be adjusted as follows. Let A be a
formula containing free variables x1, . . . , xn and constants c1, . . . cm. If A(y1/c1, . . . , ym/cm)
is the formula obtained by replacing all the constants with fresh variables y1, . . . , ym, then
IQC ⊢ A iff Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x1 · · · ∀xn∀y1 · · · ∀ymA
t(y1/c1, . . . , ym/cm).
6. Open problems
As follows from Theorem 4.5, Q◦S4.t is sound with respect to the class of Q◦S4.t-frames.
However, its completeness remains an interesting open problem. The standard Henkin con-
struction was modified by Hughes and Cresswell [13] and Corsi [3] to obtain completeness
of Q◦K. If we adapt their technique to Q◦S4.t, we obtain two relations RF and RP on the
canonical model, one coming from F and the other from P . There does not seem to be
an obvious way to select an appropriate submodel in which the restrictions of these two
relations are inverses of each other because the outer domains of accessible worlds are forced
to increase by the construction. This problem disappears when constructing the canonical
model for QS4.t because the presence of BFF and CBFP in each world allows us to select
witnesses without expanding the domains of accessible worlds, thus yielding that QS4.t is
sound and complete with respect to the class of QS4.t-frames.
The problem of completeness of Q◦S4.t seems to be closely related to the open problem,
stated in [3, p. 1510], of whether Q◦K + BF is Kripke complete. It appears that answering
one of these problems could also provide an answer to the other.
One of the reviewers pointed out that another natural direction is to study the interme-
diate predicate logics and the corresponding extensions of Q◦S4.t for which our temporal
translation remains full and faithful. Finally, it is worth investigating whether other tense
predicate logics (such as the ones considered in [11]) could be used for translating IQC fully
and faithfully. Some such systems admit presheaf semantics which is more general than
Kripke semantics.
Appendix A. Additional facts needed in Sections 4 and 5
Proposition A.1. Q◦S4.t ⊢ BFP.
Proof. We first show that Q◦S4.t ⊢ ♦F∀xB → ∀x♦FB for any formula B. We have the proof
1. ∀x(∀xB → B)
2. ∀xF (∀xB → B)
3. F (∀xB → B)→ (♦F∀xB → ♦FB)
4. ∀xF (∀xB → B)→ ∀x(♦F∀xB → ♦FB)
5. ∀x(♦F∀xB → ♦FB)
6. ∀x♦F∀xB → ∀x♦FB
7. ♦F∀xB → ∀x♦FB
Here 1 is an instance of UI◦; 2 is obtained from 1 by adding F inside ∀x by apply-
ing (NF), CBFF, and (MP); 3 is a substitution instance of the K-theorem F (C → D) →
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(♦FC → ♦FD) for F ; 4 is obtained from 3 by first adding and then distributing ∀x in-
side the implication by applying (Gen), axiom (ii) of Q◦K, and (MP); 5 follows from 2 and 4
by (MP); 6 is obtained from 5 by distributing ∀x; and 7 follows from 6 and axiom (iv) of Q◦K.
We now prove ∀xPA→ P∀xA.
1. ∀xPA→ P♦F∀xPA
2. ♦F∀xPA→ ∀x♦FPA
3. P♦F∀xPA→ P∀x♦FPA
4. ♦FPA→ A
5. ∀x♦FPA→ ∀xA
6. P∀x♦FPA→ P∀xA
7. ∀xPA→ P∀xA
Here 1 is an instance of axiom (i) of S4.t; 2 is an instance of ♦F∀xB → ∀x♦FB proved
above; 3 and 6 follow from 2 and 5 by adding and distributing P in the implication; 4 is an
instance of the S4.t-theorem ♦FPC → C; 5 is obtained from 4 by adding and distributing
∀x; and 7 follows from 1, 3, and 6. 
Lemma A.2. If A is a formula of L, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ At → FA
t and Q◦S4.t ⊢ ♦PA
t → At.
Proof. We only prove that Q◦S4.t ⊢ At → FA
t since it implies that Q◦S4.t ⊢ ♦PA
t → At.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. If A = ⊥, then At = ⊥ and it is clear
that Q◦S4.t ⊢ ⊥ → F⊥.
If A is either an atomic formula P (x1, . . . , xn) or of the form B → C or ∀xB, then A
t is
of the form FD. Therefore, the 4-axiom FD → FFD implies that in all these cases
Q◦S4.t ⊢ At → FA
t.
If A = ∃xB, then At = ♦P∃xB
t. So FA
t = F♦P∃xB
t and Q◦S4.t ⊢ ♦P∃xB
t →
F♦P∃xB
t because it is a substitution instance of the S4.t-theorem ♦PC → F♦PC. Fi-
nally, if A = B ∧ C or A = B ∨ C, then we have At = Bt ∧ Ct or At = Bt ∨ Ct. By
inductive hypothesis, Q◦S4.t ⊢ Bt → FB
t and Q◦S4.t ⊢ Ct → FC
t. Since Q◦S4.t ⊢
(FB
t ∧ FC
t) → F (B
t ∧ Ct) and Q◦S4.t ⊢ (FB
t ∨ FC
t) → F (B
t ∨ Ct), we obtain
Q◦S4.t ⊢ (Bt ∧ Ct)→ F (B
t ∧ Ct) and Q◦S4.t ⊢ (Bt ∨ Ct)→ F (B
t ∨ Ct). 
Lemma A.3. The following are theorems of Q◦S4.t:
(1) ∀y(A(y/x)→ ∃xA).
(2) ∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB) if x is not free in A.
(3) ∀x(A→ B)→ (∃xA→ B) if x is not free in B.
Proof. Follows from [3, Lem. 1.3]. 
Lemma A.4. For formulas A,B of L, the following are theorems of Q◦S4.t.
(1) F (F∀xA
t → At) if x is not free in A.
(2) ∀yF (F∀xA
t → A(y/x)t).
(3) F (A
t → ♦P∃xA
t) if x is not free in A.
(4) ∀yF (A(y/x)
t → ♦P∃xA
t).
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(5) F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (A
t → F∀xB
t)) if x is not free in A.
(6) F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (♦P∃xA
t → Bt)) if x is not free in B.
Proof. Note that x is free in A iff it is free in At, and A(y/x)t = At(y/x).
(i). We have the proof
1. ∀xAt → At
2. F∀xA
t → At
3. F (F∀xA
t → At)
where 1 is an instance of NID because x is not free in At; 2 is obtained from 1 by applying
the T-axiom for F ; 3 is obtained from 2 by (NF).
(ii). We have the proof
1. ∀y(∀xAt → At(y/x))
2. ∀y(F∀xA
t → At(y/x))
3. ∀yF (F∀xA
t → At(y/x))
where 1 is an instance of UI◦; 2 follows from 1 by applying the T-axiom for F inside ∀y;
3 is obtained from 2 by introducing F inside ∀y.
(iii). We have the proof
1. At → ∃xAt
2. At → ♦P∃xA
t
3. F (A
t → ♦P∃xA
t)
where 1 is an instance of C → ∃xC, with x not free in C, which is equivalent to NID; 2
follows from 1 by the T-axiom for ♦P ; 3 is obtained from 2 by (NF).
(iv). We have the proof
1. ∀y(At(y/x)→ ∃xAt)
2. ∀y(At(y/x)→ ♦P∃xA
t)
3. ∀yF (A
t(y/x)→ ♦P∃xA
t)
where 1 follows from Lemma A.3(i); 2 follows from 1 by applying the T-axiom for ♦P
inside ∀y; 3 is obtained from 2 by introducing F inside ∀y.
(v). We have the proof
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1. ∀x(At → Bt)→ (At → ∀xBt)
2. ∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ (At → ∀xBt)
3. F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ (FA
t → F∀xB
t)
4. F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ (At → F∀xB
t)
5. F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (A
t → F∀xB
t)
6. F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (A
t → F∀xB
t))
where 1 follows from Lemma A.3(ii); 2 follows from 1 by applying the T-axiom for F ;
3 is obtained from 2 by adding and distributing F ; 4 follows from 3 by Lemma A.2; 5 is
obtained from 4 by adding and distributing F and getting rid of one F in the antecedent
using the 4-axiom; 6 follows from 5 by (NF).
(vi). We have the proof
1. ∀x(At → Bt)→ (∃xAt → Bt)
2. ∀x(At → Bt)→ (∃x♦PA
t → Bt)
3. ∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ (∃x♦PA
t → Bt)
4. ∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ (♦P∃xA
t → Bt)
5. F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (♦P∃xA
t → Bt)
6. F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (♦P∃xA
t → Bt))
where 1 follows from Lemma A.3(iii); 2 follows from 1 by Lemma A.2; 3 follows from 2 by
applying the T-axiom forF ; 4 follows from 3 and the fact that Q
◦S4.t ⊢ ♦P∃xA
t → ∃x♦PA
t
because it is a consequence of BFP; 5 is obtained from 4 by adding and distributing F ; 6
follows from 5 by (NF). 
Lemma A.5. If C is an instance of an axiom scheme of IQC and x is the list of free variables
in C, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀xCt.
Proof. If C is an instance of a theorem of IPC, then it follows from the faithfulness of the
Go¨del translation in the propositional case that Ct is a theorem of Q◦S4.t (since F is an
S4-modality). Applying (Gen) to each free variable of Ct then yields a proof of ∀xCt in
Q◦S4.t. Translations of the axiom schemes of Definition 2.1 give:
(∀xA→ A(y/x))t = F (F∀xA
t → A(y/x)t)
(A(y/x)→ ∃xA)t = F (A(y/x)
t → ♦P∃xA
t)
(∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB))t
= F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (A
t → F∀xB
t))
(∀x(A→ B)→ (∃xA→ B))t
= F (F∀xF (A
t → Bt)→ F (♦P∃xA
t → Bt))
If C is an instance of one of these axiom schemes, then we obtain a proof of ∀xCt in Q◦S4.t
by Lemma A.4 and by applying (Gen) to the free variables of C. More precisely, for the first
axiom we use (i) of Lemma A.4 when x is not free in A and (ii) when x is free in A. Similarly,
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for the second axiom we use (iii) or (iv) of Lemma A.4. Finally, for the third axiom we use
(v) and for the fourth axiom we use (vi) of Lemma A.4. 
Lemma A.6. Let A,B be formulas of L, x the list of variables free in A→ B, y the list
of variables free in A, and z the list of variables free in B. If Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀x(A → B)t and
Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀yAt, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀zBt.
Proof. Let u be the list of variables free in A but not in B, v the list of variables free in
B but not in A, and w the list of variables free in both A and B. We then have that x
is the union of u, v, and w; y is the union of u and w; and z is the union of v and w.
Thus, we want to show that if Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀u ∀v ∀w(A → B)t and Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀u ∀wAt, then
Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀v ∀wBt. We have the proof
1. ∀u ∀v ∀wF (A
t → Bt)
2. ∀u ∀w ∀vF (A
t → Bt)
3. ∀u ∀w ∀v (FA
t → FB
t)
4. ∀u ∀w (FA
t → ∀vFB
t)
5. ∀u ∀wFA
t → ∀u ∀w ∀vFB
t
6. ∀u ∀wAt
7. ∀u ∀wFA
t
8. ∀u ∀w ∀vFB
t
9. ∀u ∀w ∀vBt
10 ∀w ∀vBt
11 ∀v ∀wBt
where 1 and 6 are assumptions; 2 and 11 follow from 1 and 10 by switching the order
of quantification; 3 is obtained from 2 by distributing F inside the universal quantifiers;
4 follows from Lemma A.3(ii) because all the variables in v are not free in FA
t; 5 is
obtained by distributing the universal quantifiers; 7 follows from 6 by introducing F inside
the quantifiers; 8 is obtained by (MP) from 5 and 7; 9 follows from 8 by the T-axiom for
F ; 10 follows from 9 by NID because no variable in u is free in B
t. 
Lemma A.7. Let A be a formula of L, x a variable, y the list of variables free in A, and z
the list of variables free in ∀xA. If Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀yAt, then Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀z (∀xA)t.
Proof. If x is in y, then without loss of generality we may assume that y is z concatenated
with x. Therefore, by assumption we have Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀z ∀xAt. If x is not in y, then y = z.
Thus, by (Gen) for x and by switching the order of quantifiers, we again obtain Q◦S4.t ⊢
∀z ∀xAt. We can then introduce F inside the quantifiers to obtain Q
◦S4.t ⊢ ∀zF∀xA
t
which means Q◦S4.t ⊢ ∀z (∀xA)t. 
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